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SOME ASPECTS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS*
EDWARD H. LEVI**
The separation of powers is a topic that has been of major importance
since the birth of our republic. Its significance as a special feature of our
system of government continues to be recognized. In an essay written not
long ago, Scott Buchanan, searching for the essential spirit of our primary
document, wrote, "All constitutions break down the whole governmental
institution into parts with specific limited powers, but the Constitution of
the United States is well known for its unusually drastic separation of
powers."'
In recent years there has been great controversy about the respective
powers, limitations and responsibilities of the executive, legislative and
judicial branches. During that period, the presidency was described by
some writers as having become imperial. It appeared we might be
developing an imperial judiciary as well. The idea of an imperial Congress
is not unknown. The present debate has been heated and has emphasized
the element of institutional conflict in the American constitutional system.
But the debate is a recurrent one in America. It has often been the
legacy of war and national scandal. In recent years it has taken concrete
form in controversies about the power of the executive to withhold the
expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature; the power of the
legislature to limit the executive's authority to use military force to protect
the nation against foreign threats; the power of the executive to withhold
information from the legislature and the judiciary (and the power of the
judiciary to set limits on that privilege); and the power of the legislature to
publish documents taken from the executive.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers was invoked on all
sides of these issues. Some have thought that the system has gone out of
* This Article is based on a speech presented for the Fourth Sulzbacher Memorial
Lecture at Columbia Law School. I wish to express my indebtedness to Jack Fuller, Ron Carr
and John Buckley, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, for their work in the prepara-
tion of this Article.
** Attorney General of the United States.
1. S. Buchanan, So Reason Can Rule; The Constitution Revisited, in GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD LIBRARY, 1975 Volume, 435, 441 [hereinafter cited as Buchanan).
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balance and that the imbalance can best be overcome by a reassertion of
power by the Congress, which, as the branch of government said to be
most democratic (or the branch mentioned first in the Constitution), should
have primacy. Congressional supremacy is said to be at the heart of the
American tradition-which, after all, began in rebellion against prerogative
and government without representation. We have had recent experience
with the abuse of executive power. We have also seen the rise of modern
totalitarian states and have been reminded of the danger of the concentra-
tion of power in a single individual.
But history has been mixed. Often, and for considerable periods of
time, the concern in the United States has been with the weakness of the
executive, not with its strength. If we have forgotten this, it is only because
memory is very short. There have been moments, some not so long ago, in
which the great concern was abuse of power by legislatures and their
committees. Some have warned that Congressional resurgence threatens to
be too great in reaction to the perceived lessons of recent history.
It may be useful to approach the doctrine of separation of powers by
looking to the origin of that idea in the interaction of intellectual theory and
practical problems during the American revolutionary era. This reference
to history will not resolve all the ambiguities of the doctrine of separation
of powers. Perhaps the ambiguities ought not be resolved. Nor will a
knowledge of the original understanding solve all our contemporary
controversies. It may be that the expansion of governmental activity into
wide areas of the nation's life, and the corresponding growth of the federal
bureaucracy, have caused an irreversible change in our constitutional sys-
tem that requires new modes of understanding. One example of the change
is the movement for congressional review of administrative action-the
product of expansive grants of authority by Congress to the executive at a
time when judicially-defined limitations on delegation have fallen. The
proposal for congressional review of administrative action results in a new
and ironic reversal of roles-the executive making laws and the legislature
wielding, in effect, the veto, and often a one-house veto at that. We should
also keep in mind that the disease of bureaucracy is as catching for the
legislature as for any other branch.
History does not suggest complete answers to the questions we now
ask ourselves. But in times of uncertainty when there are urgent calls for
change, history may provide an understanding of the values thought to be
served by, and the practical and salutary consequences thought to result
from, the separation of powers principle. It can help us calculate the
consequences of proposed realignment of government power and what may
be lost in the process.
The political theory developing in America through the period in
which the Constitution was written was influenced by many sources.
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Writers of the era drew heavily upon classical accounts of the growth and
decline of governments; Gibbon's first volume of The Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire was published, after all, in 1776. They also felt the
fresh breath of new ideas. They read Voltaire and Rousseau. Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, emphasizing the
economic vitality of separating functions. The predominant experience of
the American makers of government, however, was with the development
of the British Constitution and the relationship between the British crown
and parliament.
The political theory of the revolution was founded on a conception of
the English experience, advanced primarily by the Radical Whigs. The
central metaphor was that a compact existed between the rulers and the
ruled by which the governors were authorized to act only so long as they
did so in the interest of the nation as a whole. Liberty was conceived in
terms of the right of the people collectively to act as a check and
counterpoise to the actions of their rulers. The English Revolution of 1688
was viewed as the result of the King's violation of the compact. After 1688,
the House of Commons, as the institutional expression of one part of the
nation, could limit the prerogative of the House of Lords, and more
importantly, the King.
Yet before the American Revolution, the functioning of the British
system, if not its elemental form, was being questioned. There was a fear
that the colonies under British rule-and, indeed, Britain itself-were
suffering moral decay of the sort that beset the republics of antiquity before
their fall. There was also a characteristically ambivalent Calvinist notion
that the colonists were chosen for unique greatness but that they would
have to struggle to attain it. The King and his officers were thought to have
abused their power. Parliament offered the colonies no protection. In the
Declaration of Independence and its bill of particulars against George III,
the colonists repeated the theory of 1688. The compact had again been
broken.
Yet, despite the complaints against the King and the scourging of the
idea of hereditary monarchy in the writings of men such as Tom Paine, the
ideology of the American Revolution was surprisingly moderate. As
Gordon Wood has written, the colonists "revolted not against the English
constitution but on behalf of it. ' '2
This helps explain the influence in 1776 of Montesquieu, whose
description of the British arrangement of government institutions, though it
may be of questionable accuracy, was correct in its primary intention.
Montesquieu emphasized the idea of separation of powers. "When the
2. G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 10 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WOOD].
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legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the
same body of magistrates," Montesquieu wrote in The Spirit of the Laws,
"there can be no liberty." '3 The doctrine of separation of powers took a
particular view of men and power. It assumed that power corrupts. Its
proponents, as Justice Frankfurter later wrote, "had no illusion that our
people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities from
the hazards of concentrated power."'4 The doctrine was based upon the
skeptical idea that only the division of power among three government
institutions-executive, legislative, and judicial-could counteract the
inevitable tendency of concentrated authority to overreach and threaten
liberty.
But in 1776 the complaint was with the Crown. In the colonies, the
King-the executive power-had acted unchecked, often with the Par-
liament's-but not the colonists'-consent. The doctrine of separation of
powers was seen as a means of controlling executive power. Its skeptical
view of man, government and power did not wholly square with the
buoyant optimism of the times, just as, not so long ago, the separation of
powers seemed a frustrating barrier to the possible accomplishments which
might follow from an assumed unlimited abundance of resources and to
that creativity which could solve every problem. After 1776, as the new
American states began to replace their colonial charters with new
constitutions, strong language favoring separation of powers was a regular
feature. As Gordon Wood has written, however, there was a
great discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate
the several governmental departments and the actual political
practice the state governments followed. It seems, as historians
have noted, that Americans in 1776 gave only a verbal recognition
to the concept of separation of powers in their Revolutionary
constitutions, since they were apparently not concerned with a
real division of departmental functions. 5
In 1776 separation of powers was a slogan; it meant that power was to be
separated from the executive and given to legislatures.
After the Revolution was won, the optimism faded. The experience of
the new American states with life under the Articles of Confederation and
under the legislatures, set up and made all-powerful in 1776, convinced
George Washington that "[w]e have, probably, had too good an opinion of
human nature in forming our confederation." 6
The legislatures had assumed great power, and their rule-for a variety
of reasons-was unstable. The supremacy of legislatures came to be recog-
3. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 70 (Hutchins ed. 1952).
4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
5. WOOD, supra note 2, at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
6. Letter from Washington to Jay, August 15, 1786, 3 PAPERS OF JAY 208 (Johnston ed.
1970), quoted in WOOD, supra note 2, at 472.
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nized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities.
The legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money schemes,
suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts. They changed the law
with great frequency. One New Englander complained: "[t]he revised laws
have been altered-realtered-made better-made worse; and kept in such
a fluctuating position, that persons in civil commission scarce know what is
law." 7
Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, wrote this stinging
attack upon the interregnum period legislatures:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating of these in the
same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government. It
will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by
a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and
seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one....
And little will it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves. An
elective despotism was not the government we fought for ... .8
The work of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was in this respect
a reaction to the unchecked power of the legislatures. In the later rewriting
of history, the abuses to be corrected were sometimes seen solely in the
context of federalism. But much more was involved. The doctrine of
separation of powers, which had been another way of saying legislative
supremacy in 1776, was reinvigorated in 1787 as a criticism of legislative
power and was central to the theory of the new government. As Gordon
Wood has written, "[t]yranny was now seen as the abuse of power by any
branch of the government, even, and for some especially, by the traditional
representatives of the people." 9 Madison wrote: "[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 10
The liberty that was now emphasized was "the protection of individual
rights against all governmental encroachments, particularly by the
legislature, the body which the Whigs had traditionally cherished as the
people's exclusive repository of their public liberty .. ."I' The structure
of government had to be such that no single institution could exert all
power. Against the "enterprising ambition" of legislative power, wrote
Madison in Federalist 48, "which is inspired, by a supposed influence over
the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength," the people
should "indulge all their jealously and exhaust all their precautions." 1 2
Hamilton, too, warned:
7. Id. at 405.
8. Quoted in FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 48 (Madison), 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 158 (Hutchins ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as FEDERALIST].
9. WOOD, supra note 2, at 608.
10. FEDERALIST No. 47 (Madison), supra note 8, at 153.
11. WOOD, supra note 2, at 609.
12. FEDERALIST No. 48 (Madison), supra note 8, at 157.
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The representatives of the people in a popular assembly seem
sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and
betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign
of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its
rights, by either the executive or the judiciary were a breach of
their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear
disposed to exert an imperious control over the other
departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side,
they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult
for the other members of the government to maintain the balance
of the Constitution.1 3
Hamilton's words, and the Federalist Papers as a whole, express two
related aspects of the new American conception of politics that emerged
from the experiences of the interregnum period. First, that the people, and
not the institutions of government, are sovereign. The Constitution after all
begins with "We, the People." Second, that no institution of government
is, or should be taken to be, the embodiment of society expressing the
general will of the people. In the process of this fundamental shift away
from the Whig conception of the British Constitution, the doctrine of
separation of powers took on a new meaning. Each branch of government
served the sovereign people. No branch could correctly claim to be, the
sole representative of the people. Representation was to be by each of
them, according to the functions they performed. Each branch derived its
powers from the people, and those powers were subject to the limitation
imposed by the constitutional grant of authority. Government power was
divided among the branches, and a system of interdependence was erected
by which each branch had certain limited powers to control the excesses of
other branches. In this way it was hoped that the public interest could be
served and that, at the same time, liberty could be protected from tyranny.
As Buchanan has written,
'We the People are the authority that propagates the
Constitution, a master law which in turn establishes other
authorities or offices which in turn propagate other laws... [T]he
Constitution distinguishes three great offices, powers or functions:
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; and to them are
assigned respectively three uses of practical reason: the making of
laws, the executing or administration of laws, and the adjudication
of laws. Furthermore, the Constitution not only divides these
functions but also separates them by making the institutions equal
and independent." 1 4
The doctrine of federalism was based on a similar conception. The national
government was made supreme, but only in a limited compass defined by
limited powers. Thus, the sovereign people and the states retained all
powers not delegated to the national government.
The compact between the rulers and the ruled had changed its
13. FEDERALIST No. 71 (Hamilton), supra note 8, at 215.
14. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 442.
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fundamental terms. Rather than a general agreement by the people to be
governed for such time as the rulers acted in the interest of society as a
whole, the new compact was seen as something closer to a limited agency
arrangement in which each branch of government was authorized to act for
the people in unique ways in limited areas. One must be cautious, as
Alexander Bickel has taught, about using such contractual metaphors lest
they make the institutions seem too sharply defined in their powers.1 s The
provisions in the Constitution were, rather, the expression of compro-
mises, mirroring the sort of adaptive and accommodative process the
Constitution set into motion. But there is no doubt that the separation of
powers was consciously intended as a confrontation with problems to be
solved and, in its new form, an invention for the future.
The Congress was delegated enumerated legislative powers and such
other power as was "necessary and proper" to effectuate those
enumerated powers. The executive was to be more energetic than it had
been in the interregnum state constitutions. Whether executive power was
also meant to be limited by enumeration quickly, became a matter of
controversy between Hamilton and Madison after the Constitution was
ratified. Some years ago Professor Crosskey argued that the enumerated
powers of the Congress were not so much a limitation on legislative power
as a way of clearly stating the power of Congress so that the executive
could not so easily encroach upon it. But Crosskey was concerned with
opposing states' rights, not with limiting the executive. And his argument
was really directed toward showing that the enumeration did not limit
national power. 16
There was no question, however, that the Constitution meant to
expand the power of the executive. "Energy in the Executive," wrote
Hamilton in Federalist.70, is a leading character in the definition of good
government.
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and
highhanded combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. 17
And Jay added that the President must be unitary and protected in the
conduct of foreign affairs, in part because those who would supply useful
intelligence "would rely on the secrecy of the President" but would not
confide "in that of the Senate and still less in that of a large popular
Assembly." 18
15. See BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
16. See CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1953).
17. FEDERALIST No. 70 (Hamilton), supra note 8, at 210.
18. FEDERALIST No. 64 (Jay), supra note 8, at 196.
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At the same time the judiciary, which had been subject to significant
encroachments by the revolutionary period legislatures, began to be seen
as another important bulwark against tyranny. Though distrusted before
the revolution as an arbitrary mechanism of the Crown, the courts rose
dramatically in importance after the experiences of the interregnum peri-
od. 19 But the courts were not to assume that "energetic" power Hamilton
asserted for the executive. Theirs was a more passive power-not only to
articulate and apply the principles of law with justice in individual cases,
but also to repel attacks, by the legislature or executive, on basic rights. It
was a vital but limited power. The view of the courts contained, I believe,
a good deal of the continuing English view, articulated in our time by Lord
Devlin, that "it would not be good for judges to act executively; it is better
to expect executives to act judicially." ' 20 James Wilson, who favored
judicial power to nullify unconstitutional statutes in the Constitutional
Convention debates also warned against conferring "upon the judicial
department a power superior, in its general nature, to that of the
legislature.' '21
The constitutional system recognized the possibility of disagreement
among the branches, but it defined the channels through which those
conflicts were to be resolved. Indeed, Madison was obliged to defend the
draft of constitution against the argument that the three branches had not
been made separate enough.
Appealing to Montesquieu, Madison wrote, "[h]is meaning . . . can
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power
of another department, fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted." ' 22 Acting within its sphere-within the constitutional limits of
its power and within the bounds created by the institutional responsibilities
of the other branches-each branch was to be supreme, subject only to the
decisions of the people. Each branch had a degree of independence so that
its activities would not be entirely taken over by another. But they had a
degree of interdependence as well so that, in Madison's words, "ambition
[could] be made to counteract ambition." '2 3
The system also contemplated responsibility and accommodation, for,
though the branches were separate, they were part of one government. As
Justice Jackson wrote, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better
to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis-
19. WOOD, supra note 2, at 453-54.
20. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 78 (Yale 1958).
21. Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 WORKS OF WILSON 460-62 (Wilson ed.), quoted in
WOOD, supra note 2, at 305.
22. FEDERALIST No. 47 (Madison), supra note 8, at 154.
23. FEDERALIST No. 51 (Madison), supra note 8, at 163.
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persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
24
The exhilaration of the Revolution and the despair of the
misgovernment that followed it, the optimistic political philosophies of
Locke and Rousseau and the pessimistic views of Montesquieu and
Hobbes, all came together in the creation of the American republic.
Michael Kammen has written:
What would eventually emerge from these tensions between
liberty and authority, between society and its instruments of
government? For one thing, a political style, a way of doing and
viewing public affairs in which several sorts of biformities would
be prevalent: pragmatic idealism, conservative liberalism, orderly
violence, and moderate rebellion. 25
I would add to that list of paradoxes one more-skeptical optimism. It was
this vision of man and government that formed the basis for the separation
of powers doctrine.
At various times in the 19th Century and after, the idea of the potential
excellence of human nature and the trustworthiness of unchecked popular
will reasserted itself. As Martin Diamond wrote recently in Public Interest:
In the 19th Century, there were many who mocked Montesquieu
for his fear of political power and for his cautious institutional
strategies . . . . But let those now mock who read the 20th
Century as warranting credence in such a conception of human
nature, as entitling men to adventures in unrestrained power.
26
The 19th Century was a time of great Romantic idealism. The indus-
trial revolution deified Energy, and the Romantic writers expressed their
adulation because, to them, men and nature shared in the abundant energy
and grace of life. The 20th Century has slowly brought changes in this
view, though in some respects it lingers. In literature, the glorification of
human energy and spirit is tempered by metaphors of entropy and
humbling intellectual paradoxes. If the emphasis is still upon the self, that
self shares the potential cruelty of nature, its ineluctable process of running
down, and its fundamental impenetrability to observation. The skeptical
vision embodied in the separation of powers doctrine again has its
intellectual resonance.
But in the 19th Century, particularly following the Civil War, there
was a reemergence of the Whig theory that the legislature is the best
expression of the people's will. Congress gained ascendency. During that
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
25. M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 165 (1972).
26. Diamond, Liberty, Democracy and the Founders, 41 PUB. INTEREST 54 (1975).
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period Woodrow Wilson finished his essay, Congressional Government.27
It is an important work to study today since it challenges the American
system of separation of powers. To Wilson, the British parliamentary form
of government seemed superior. He favored-that system because legislative
ascendency and executive decline under our form of government seemed to
him inevitable. The parliamentary system made the legislature responsible
and effective and also provided for executive leadership. "The noble
charter of fundamental law given us by the Convention of 1787," he wrote,
is still our Constitution, but it is now our form of government
rather in name than in reality, the form of government being one
of nicely adjusted, ideal balances, whilst the actual form of our
present government is simply a scheme of congressional suprem-
acy .... All niceties of constitutional restriction, and even many
broad principles of constitutional limitation have been overridden
and a thoroughly organized system of congressional control set up
which gives a very rude negative to some theories of balance and
some schemes for distributed powers . . .28
Wilson, in the 1880's, saw the presidency as incurably weakened. "That
high office has fallen from its first estate of dignity, because its power has
waned; and its power has waned because the power of Congress has
become predominant." 29 Though some years later he saw a greater hope in
the reassertion of an energetic executive, in the 1880's the only remedy for
the failings of congressional supremacy seemed a fundamental change in
the system. Referring to Wilson's warnings about congressional power in
the American system, Walter Lippmann said,
[T]he morbid symptoms which he identified are still clearly
recognizable when the disease recurs, and there is a relapse into
Congressional supremacy .... It is a good book to have read at
the end of the Truman and at the beginning of the Eisenhower
Administrations. 30
It is also excellent reading today, not the least because of Wilson's
observations that
[i]f there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in
any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising,
somebody must be trusted, in order that when things go wrong it
may be quite plain who should be punished .... Power and strict
accountability of its use are the essential constituents of good
government. 31
27. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(Meridian Books ed., 1956) [hereinafter cited as WILSON].
28. Id. at 28, 31.
29. Id. at 48.
30. W. Lippmann, Introduction, WILSON, supra note 27, at 8.
31. WILSON, supra note 27, at 186-87.
President Taft envisioned a new system just as Wilson did in his appeal to the
parliamentary system. In his 1912 message to Congress, Taft recommended that members of
the cabinet be given seats in each house of Congress. "There has been much lost in the
[Vol. 76:371
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The Wilson text, which arose out of a concern for the weakness of
executive power, is often turned to these days because of a yearning for the
perceived legislative power of the British system. Wilson in the 1880's
believed that legislative inquiry into the administration of government was
even more important than lawmaking. The answer to executive weakness
was to be a form of parliamentary executive government. Wilson's model
of the process of legislative inquiry was the question period in Parliament.
"No cross-examination is more searching than that to which a minister of
the Crown is subjected by the all-curious Commons," Wilson wrote.32
This gives a clue as to what sort of questioning he thought appropriate.
The question period in Parliament, however, is not what it is often
thought to be. It is a strictly disciplined affair. Precedent has established
the impermissibility of a wide variety of questions-including those seeking
an expression of opinion, or information about an issue pending in court, or
proceedings of the Cabinet or Cabinet committee, or information about
past history for purpose of argument. In addition, the Speaker has always
held that a Minister has no obligation to answer a question-though if he
fails to answer, he must suffer the political consequences. A Minister may
always decline to answer, either because the matter under inquiry is not
within his responsibility or, more importantly, because to give the
information requested would be contrary to the public interest. 33 The
reason for such wide discretion for the Ministers seems clear to British
writers, though it might shock those who would substitute parliamentary
forms for our own because of distrust of the wisdom of separation of
powers. "Had the Speaker ruled otherwise," observed two contemporary
students of the question period, "he would have had to devise some form
of disciplinary action suitable for extracting an answer out of a stubborn
Minister."'34
While it is true that tne Minsters in Britain are directly accountable to
the legislators-and this might make it seem a commodious system to those
who prefer legislative supremacy-the British system also allows the Prime
Minister to choose whatever moment he may for a national election of
legislators. The relationship between executive and legislative is neither
more relaxed nor more one-sided in Britain than it is in our system. The
machinery," Taft wrote, "due to the lack of cooperation and interchange of views face to face
between the representatives of the executive and the members of the two legislative branches
of the government. It was never intended that they should be separated in the sense of not
being in effective touch and relationship to each other." 49 CONG. REc. 895, 62d Cong., 3d
Sess. (1912). This idea was, of course, never accepted. Had it been, the process of
interchange between executive and legislature would have been much different than the model
of congressional inquiry by testimony to committees as it works today.
32. WILSON, supra note 27, at 196.
33. T. MAY, TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF
PARLIAMENT 357 et seq. (Fellows, Corks & Campion eds., 16th ed., 1957).
34. D. CHESTER & N. BOWRING, QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT 300 (1962).
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Cabinet is directly accountable to Parliament, but Parliament sits only at
the indulgence of the Cabinet.
That is not our system, and I doubt whether anyone seriously thinks of
altering our Constitution so drastically as to make it our system. But one
cannot have a parliamentary system without such drastic changes. The
features of parliamentary government that may seem most appealing to the
proponents of legislative supremacy upon closer examination turn out to be
imaginary because the British system, as it was in Montesquieu's
description, is also in fact a system of separated powers.
In recent time, it seems that the congressional government Wilson
wrote about has given way to an equally problematical presidential
government. One of the reasons given for this change was that the
complexity and immediacy of the problems of the modern world required a
strong President. But Jefferson saw the same need at the time of the
Louisiana Purchase. He called that transaction, "an act beyond the
Constitution," but said it had been done "in seizing the fugitive occurrence
which so advances the good of [the] country... 35 It was a necessary act.
as he saw it, not only beyond executive, but also beyond legislative,
authority. Whether the reasons for presidential power be new or old, there
has been a feeling that both the executive and the judiciary have assumed
functions that properly belong to the legislature.
The encroachment of one branch of our federal government upon the
functions of another is not a new phenomenon. The tendency of a
governmental department to augment its own powers may be thought to be
an inherent tendency of government generally, although its consequences
are all the more serious in a system whose very genius is a tripartite
separation of governing powers.
The instances of such infringement throughout our history are re-
flected in the case law. In re Debs,36 in which the Supreme Court upheld
an injunction issued without express statutory authority, might be viewed
as a case in which both the Court and the executive usurped the legislative
function of Congress. The Steel Seizure Case,37 in which President
Truman without statutory authority commandeered the nation's steel mills,
is perhaps the most famous example of the executive arrogating to itself the
law-making power of Congress. Ex parte Milligan38 represented the execu-
tive's attempt during the Civil War to exercise the judicial power to try
criminal cases. The Supreme Court, too, has not been entirely immune to
the temptation to stray into the province of the other branches.3 9
35. Letter to John Breckinridge, reprinted in 4 ANNALS OF AMER. 172 (1968).
36. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).




The necessity of protecting each branch against encroachment by the
others has not gone unmet. The Speech and Debate Clause of the
Constitution has been given a broad construction to insulate the Congress
against unwarranted interference in the performance of its duties. The
Gravel40 case held that the Clause confers absolute immunity on Con-
gressmen and their aides for acts performed in furtherance of their legisla-
tive functions. The protected act in that case involved Senator Gravel's
decision to read classified documents, known popularly as the Pentagon
Papers, into the public record at a meeting of a Congressional subcommit-
tee. The Eastland case,41 decided last Term, held that the Speech and
Debate Clause prevented the issuance of an injunction against a Congres-
sional committee, its members and staff, so long as the committee is acting
broadly within its "legitimate legislative sphere." The committee in that
case had issued a subpoena against a bank to obtain the records of a
dissident organization as part of its study of the administration and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Eastland case states
a reaffirmation of the separation of powers. Indeed, it says that the Speech
and Debate Clause "serves the ... function of reinforcing the separation
of powers so deliberately established by the Founders."
42
But the problems are not simple. Congress has on occasion intruded
upon the functions of the other branches. United States v. Klein43 involved
an attempt by Congress to limit the effect of the President's pardon power
by depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce certain indemnification
claims. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated separation of
powers since it invaded the judicial province by "prescrib[ing] [a] rule of
decision" in pending cases and infringed upon the power of the Executive
by "impairing the effect of a pardon."
44
Congressional investigations have also tended to assume a purpose
divorced from legitimate legislative functions. In 1881 in Kilbourn v.
Thompson45 the Court severely curbed Congress's contempt power and
warned that Congress had no "general power of making inquiry into the
private affairs of the citizen." '46 The period after World War II, as perhaps
is the case after most wars, saw an exercise of the legislature's investiga-
tory power, but far broader than in any previous period. Eventually it was
recognized that that power could be abused to impose sanctions on indi-
vidual conduct and beliefs without the vital protections to personal liberty
40. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
41. Eastland v. United States Service Men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
42. Id. at 502, quoting from United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
43. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
44. Id. at 146, 147.
45. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
46. Id. at 190.
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and privacy that law and the judicial process affords. In some instances the
Court identified the abuse and pronounced appropriate limits on the power.
In Watkins v. United States,4 7 it reversed a conviction that resulted when a
witness refused to answer certain questions before a House committee.
The Court reasoned that the conviction was improper since the ambiguous
purpose of the committee's inquiry precluded any determination whether
the questions were pertinent to the committee's proper legislative tasks.
The Court cautioned that, although the power to conduct investigations is
inherent in the legislative power, "[t]here is no general authority to expose
the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of Congress. . . Nor is Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments." ' 48
On occasion, Congress has also used its legislative power directly to
invade the powers of other branches. In the Lovett case, 49 the Court held
that a statute forbidding payment of compensation to three named
government employees was unconstitutional because it imposed
punishment without a judicial trial and thus constituted a "bill of
attainder." United States v. Browns" involved a statute making it a crime
for a member of the Communist Party to be an official or employee of a
labor union. The Court also held this to be a bill of attainder. The
constitutional prohibition against such bills of attainder, the Court
observed, was an integral part of the separation of powers. The prohibition
"reflected the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well
suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon
the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific
persons." 51
The Supreme Court has also attempted to protect the Executive
against improper Congressional intrusion on its prerogatives. It is
interesting to note that Morrison, in commenting on Washington's first
administration, writes that
Heads of departments had to be appointed by the President, with
the consent of the Senate, but Congress, in organizing executive
departments, might have made their heads responsible to and
removable by itself. Instead it made the secretaries of state and
war responsible to the President alone, and subject to his direction
within their legal competence.5 2
Myers v. United States5 3 upheld the power of the President to remove
executive officers appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. In
47. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
48. Id. at 187.
49. United States v. Lovett,.328 U.S. 303 (1946).
50. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
51. Id. at 445.
52. S. MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 319 (1965).
53. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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declaring unconstitutional a statute requiring the consent of the Senate for
removal, the Court stated that the executive power vested in the President
under Article II must include unlimited discretion to remove subordinates
whose performance the President regards, for whatever reason, as unsatis-
factory. By attempting to limit that discretion, the Court noted, the
statute violated the principle of separation of powers and would have given
Congress unwarranted authority "to vary fundamentally the operation of
the great independent branch of government and thus most seriously to
weaken it."' 54 The Court also rejected as a "fundamental misconception"
the idea that Congress is the only defender of the people in the
government.55 "The President," the Court observed, "is a representative
of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and
it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by
all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the
members of either body of the Legislature . .. '6
These cases occurred because on occasion each branch has abused the
power entrusted to it. In some instances the Court has been able and
willing to provide remedies. In other instances, as in Debs, the Court has
failed to perceive the problem or has participated in creating it.
In periods of reaction to past events-and we are now in such a
period-it is more than ever necessary to contemplate the fundamental
guidance which a living constitution is intended to provide. The essence of
the separation of powers concept formulated by the Founders from the
political experience and philosophy of the revolutionary era is that each
branch, in different ways, within the sphere of its defined powers and
subject to the distinct institutional responsibilities of the others, is essential
to the liberty and security of the people. Each branch, in its own way, is
the people's agent, its fiduciary for certain purposes.
Two points, I think, follow from this conception and, in the course of
our history, have been perceived as following from it. First, whether power
has been rightly exercised, or exercised within the limits the Constitution
defines, is not always a problem of separation of powers. Some powers
have been confided to no branch. Abuse of power in that context may
mean that the limits should be enforced on all branches of government, not
that the power is better conferred on and exercised by a branch other than
that which has abused it. A corollary of this is that a weakness in one
branch of the government is not always best corrected by weakening
another branch.
Second, and perhaps most remarkable, is that the cases which to some
extent define the allocation of power among the branches are relatively
54. Id. at 127.




few. That fact is a testament to the respect that each branch generally has
maintained for the powers and responsibilities of the others, and to an
understanding that each branch, within its sphere, represents and serves
the people's interest. As Scott Buchanan has written, in our constitutional
system each branch ultimately relies for its authority on its power to
persuade the people.5 7 In this sense, each branch is democratic, as each is
specially representative, whatever its manner of selection. Fiduciaries do
not meet their obligations by arrogating to themselves the distinct duties of
their master's other agents. Inevitably, in a system of divided powers,
there are points where responsibility conflicts, where legitimate interests
and demands appear on either side. In such instances, accommodation and
compromise reflecting the exigencies of the matter at hand have been not
only possible but a felt necessity. The essence of compromise is that
principle or power is surrendered by neither side, but that there is a respect
for the responsibility of others and recognition of the need for flexibility
and reconciliation of competing interests.
This general respect and felt need for accommodation have affected
the role of the courts. Recognizing the limits of their own proper functions
and institutional competence, the courts had long employed a series of
devices that had, as their ultimate purpose, avoiding interference with the
powers and functions of the other branches. These restrictions, founded in
the case or controversy requirement of Article III or, frankly, in prudential
considerations that must govern the exercise of judicial power, defined and
narrowed the occasions on which judicial resolution may be sought. But
they recognized, too, fhat certain questions may be better left without
resolution in law, and should be allowed to work themselves out in the
political process and in the ad hoc process of accommodation.
To some extent-perhaps more substantially than had been thought-
these barriers to judicial resolution remain. In United States v.
Richardson,58 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer,
lacked standing to obtain an injunction requiring, under the Constitution's
Statement and Account Clause, a published accounting of Central
Intelligence Agency expenditures. Justice Powell, in his concurring
opinion, wrote that: "[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly
related to the expansion of judicial power. . . . [A]llowing unrestricted
taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of
power at the national level. . .."59
There is discomfort in uncertainty. Longing for simple, straight an-
swers about the allocation of powers among the branches and the respon-
sibilities of each to the other, some assume that the courts can provide the
57. Buchanan, supra note 1.
58. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
59. Id. at 188.
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answers by deduction from constitutional principles and can properly act as
umpire between the other branches. In some instances, as in the Steel
Seizure case where private interests were directly affected, this may be the
inevitable consequence of the courts' performance of their proper duties.
But there are other instances in which the dispute may be purely one
between the institutional interests of the Congress and of the executive.
The intervention of the courts in this area may expand if they recognize
standing in members of Congress to challenge the legality of executive
actions. Some courts have done so, apparently on the ground that the
executive's action diminishes congressional power and thus the power of
each member. 60
Resolution of such disputes provides a kind of certainty. But this is an
area of great difficulty, requiring caution. There is no doubt that judicial
intervention is sometimes essential. However, the danger in attempting to
provide final answers is not only that the courts will inevitably alter the
balance between Congress and the executive in the context of a particular
situation, but also that the very nature of this kind of determination, when
the interactions of a government of checks and balances are involved, may
then require continuing judicial supervision. This would constitute a
removal to the courts of judgments of responsibility and discretion, and
would significantly alter the balance between the courts and the other
branches. The consequence may well be to weaken rather than strengthen
accountability. We are sometimes said to be a litigious people, but the
Constitution, while it establishes a rule of law, was not intended to create a
government by litigation. A government by representation through differ-
ent branches, and with interaction and discussion, would be much nearer
the mark.
The current controversies, concerning the demands of one branch of
the government for information in the hands of another, reflect some of the
complexities. Congress has in some instances, through its own legislation,
placed statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information in the execu-
tive's possession. 61 Some of these statutes, no doubt, would never have
been enacted without such restrictions. When the executive denies
information to Congress un er such statutes, his action has nothing to do
with executive privilege. It has to do with the good faith interpretation of a
statute. Some "'of 'these statutes,' by their own terms, represent a
government's pedge of confidentiality to its citizens. 62 Congress, which
passed the statute, took part in making that pledge.
60. E.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
61. E.g., 26 U:.C. § 6103 (1970) (tax retums),42 U.S.C. § 1306(a), (d) (1970) (social
security returns).





The construction of these statutes, if the appropriate forum can be
found, is a standard judicial task identical to the kinds of decisions which
courts make frequently. The issue raises separation of powers problems
only to the extent that it concerns the ability of the legislature, having once
enacted a statute, to place its own interpretation by later committee action,
without later enactment, on the meaning to be given to the words used.
There have, of course, been many disputes between Congress and the
courts on similar issues. To be sure, some recently advanced
interpretations of such statutes concern most directly the power of the
Congress, to the point of asserting that Congress may not constitutionally
grant a confidentiality against itself.63 Such a principle bears no resem-
blance to the system the Constitution established. The primary argument
has been that such statutes, unless they mention Congress specifically, do
not mean what they appear to say. 4 In the long run, a dispute of this latter
nature might best be resolved by the establishment of a Congressional
commission to review the numerous statutes, involving citizens' claims to
privacy, and then through revision and reenactment to make explicit the
limitation on the apparent confidentiality conferred.
In other quite different instances, the demand of a legislative commit-
tee for documents or testimony can raise the issue of executive privilege.
Even in such instances, however, it is important to stress that the
requirement for some confidentiality is not unique to any one branch of the
government. It is a need that Congress and the judiciary have also asserted
and attempted to meet. It is a need which all advanced countries have
recognized, whether or not they have a doctrine of separation of powers.
Nor is it, of course, solely a governmental necessity. As the Supreme
Court acknowledged in NAACP v. Alabama,65 invasion of privacy by
investigation and publication can impose grave harm, and, indeed, can at
times be employed to deter the exercise of fundamental rights.
One primary area of responsibility has been the confidentiality of the
decision-making process. The Constitution provides a structure in which
some decisions are normally made in public; the founders were quite
explicit that others should not be. There is a theory in science that one can
never know with certainty what one is observing since the process neces-
sary for observation can change what is observed. Scientists among you
will know, far better than I, whether the analogy is apt. But the principle is
suggestive. As the Supreme Court recently said: "[h]uman experience
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may
63. Testimony of Raoul Berger in Contempt Proceedings against Secretary of Commerce
Rogers C.B. Morton before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,56 (1975).
64. Testimony of Professor Philip Kurland in House Proceedings, supra note 63, at
107-08.
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process."' 66 But the need
for confidentiality to protect the safety of citizens and individual rights goes
beyond the decision-making process. The protection of some information is
essential to the security of the nation and to the conduct of foreign affairs.
Of course there are competing considerations: an informed public is essen-
tial in a democratic republic; Congress requires information for informed
legislation; the courts, on occassion, must have access to information in the
possession of the executive to make an informed adjudication. There is a
conflict of values, a necessary ordering of means and ends, with the public
good as the common objective.
Historically, in this area too, compromise has been our course. From
the Burr case67 early in our history to very recent years, means have been
found in judicial proceedings for leaving the decision on disclosure to the
Executive in ways found-and enforced-by the Courts to be consistent
with fairness to litigants. The only exception to that rule was established by
the Supreme Court in 1973 in United States v. Nixon.6s The case was
singular in the circumstances that foreclosed the normal means of
accommodation to protect both the public and private interests involved.
Although the Court required disclosure in the unique circumstances of
the case, it expressly recognized that the executive's right of confidentiality
is a necessary adjunct to the executive's constitutional power. While this
right obviously should be used carefully and discreetly, and with an under-
standing of the comity which must exist among the branches of
government, it is perhaps well to remind those concerned about an imperial
presidency that too limited a right of executive privilege can drive
deliberations into a more centralized and dependent f6cus-a result directly
contrary to what they would wish.
In recent years, there have been calls, perhaps generated by abuses on
both sides, for a final resolution by the courts of Congress' right to demand
disclosure and of the executive power to refuse. To a limited degree, these
calls have been answered-although in a way that cannot have been satis-
factory either to the advocates of congressional power or to the advocates
of the executive. In United States v. Nixon, private interests were, as the
Court recognized, immediately affected. Moreover, since the conflict
Involved, in one of its dimensions, the integrity of the judicial process, it
was necessary for the Court to come to a judgment of relative interests.
But in Senate Select Committee v. Nixon 69 (in which jurisdiction was
66. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
67. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
68. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
69. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane).
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based on a statute specially enacted for purposes of the case)70 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Senate Select
Committee's need for the information did not, in the circumstances,
outweigh the executive's need for confidentiality, so that the executive did
not have a legal obligation to comply with the committee's subpoena.
Perhaps the values and needs asserted on both sides were matters not
susceptible to judicial calibration. The court's statements about the Con-
gress's need for information provides little comfort to those who insist on
unrestricted congressional access.
Cases may arise in which judicial resolution is necessary. They are
most likely if the Congress-as some of its committees have recently
threatened to do-asserts its authority by attempting to hold in contempt
executive officers who act under a presidential assertion of privilege or who
conform to the mandate of a statute, as interpreted by the Attorney
General. Under present circumstances, if Congress were to take such a
course, it could ask for the official's indictment-a road with incredible
problems, outside the spirit of the Constitution, and carrying a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of one month. Or it could take the more
traditional course, little used in this century and never against an
incumbent cabinet officer, of attempting itself to impose coercive or
punitive restraints. In the latter case, I suppose, an application for habeas
corpus would be the officer's appropriate remedy. Either course would be,
at the least, unedifying, the more so when punishment rather than
clarification is sought. It would be an attempt by one branch to assert its
authority by imposing personal sanctions on officials who seek to perform
their duty for another branch equal to the Congress in its responsibility to
serve the people. This is neither the level of statesmanship which created
our republic, nor is it justified by past abuses. Such an attempt would not
rectify abuses; it would supplant them with new ones.
These radical devices have been used little in the past, not only
because respect and considerations of comity have overcome the pressures
of the moment, but because, I think, there has been an implicit, perhaps
intuitive, appreciation that judicial resolution, whatever it ultimately might
be, would have severe costs.
The separation of powers doctrine, as Scott Buchanan wisely
emphasized, is a political doctrine. It is based, he wrote, on the idea that
government institutions given separate functions, organizations and powers
will operate with different modes of reasoning. Each mode is important to
the processes of law formation and to the generation of popular consent to
the law. 71
70. Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736.
71. Buchanan, supra note 1, passim.
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Separation of powers was also designed to control the power of
government by tension among the branches, with each, at the margin,
limiting the other. But there is a misperception about that tension. For
example, Arthur Schlesinger once described the doctrine as creating
"permanent guerrilla warfare" between the executive and legislative
branches. 72 To be sure, the authors of the Constitution had a realistic view
of man and government and power. They assumed that from time to time
men in power might grow too bold and, by overreaching, threaten liberty
and the balance of the system. They designed the system so that the
overreaching-the threatened tyranny-might be checked.
But they did not envision a government in which each branch seeks
out confrontation; they hoped the system of checks and balances would
achieve a harmony of purposes differently fulfilled. The branches of
government were not designed to be at war with one another. The
relationship was not to be an adversary one, though to think of it that way
has become fashionable. One would not want to suggest that the Supreme
Court, for example, ought to view each case before it as a chance to
increase or protect its institutional power. Justice Stone and others have
written of the importance of the Court's sense of self-restraint. The
importance of self-restraint applies as well to the executive and legislature.
If history were to teach any lesson, that, rather than new cycles of
aggression, might be the one.
Institutional self-restraint does not mean that we must have a
government of hesitancy. It does mean that the duty to act is coupled with
a duty to act with care and comity and with a sense of the higher values we
all cherish. This is the wisdom of the separation of powers, for as
Buchanan wrote, "[u]nder our constitution the law divides itself so that
reason can rule." 73
The Founders of the Republic, as the Federalist Papers state, thought
they had found "means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of
republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided." 74 Among those means was "the regular distribution of power
into distinct departments." ' 7 - For a country which has come through a
storm, aided so greatly by the wisdom of the basic document thus
fashioned, some reflection and an ability to take the longer view is now
called for. We owe that much to the Founders; we owe that much to
ourselves.
72. Schlesinger, First Lecture, in A. SCHLESINGER & DE GROGIN, CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLES IN MODERN TIMES 3 (1967).
73. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 460.
74. FEDERALIST No. 9 (Hamilton), supra note 8, at 47.
75. Id.
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